\u3cem\u3eUnited States v. O\u27Hagan\u3c/em\u3e: Defining the Limits of Fraud and Deceptive Pretext Under Rule 10b-5 by McCullough, Theodore C.
NOTE
United States v. O'Hagan: Defining the Limits of
Fraud and Deceptive Pretext Under Rule 10b-5
Theodore C. McCullough*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you had information regarding the results of a horse race
before the race was even run. More than a gambler's dream, the
trading of stocks based upon inside information' is a phenomenon
which is real and, by some accounts, pervasive. For numerous
reasons, insider trading is considered problematic.3 In particular,
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1. See United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1996) (defining inside information
as "material nonpublic information").
2. Hong Kong Man Fined $2 Million by the SEC for Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Jun. 27,
1997, at A4. See generally Ex-Chase Employee to Settle SEC Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1998,
at C9; Michael Schroeder, Nine Charged in an Insider-Trading Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1998,
at B2; Patrick McGeehan and Dean Starkman, Floor Brokers on Big Board Charged in Scheme,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1998, at Cl; Broker Pleads Guilty to Perjury in Probe of Trading in Lotus,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1998, at C14; Ex-Bankers Trust Executive Is Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 1998, at C26; Six Told to Pay Total of $604,704 to Settle an SEC Insider Case, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 8, 1998, at A4; Sougata Mukherjee, Whispering Secrets to Friends Sure Way to Land in Hot
Water, DENVER Bus. J., Jan. 2, 1998, at 37A; John Emshwiller and Eva M. Rodriguez, Stock
Promoter Enters a Guilty Plea in Connection to Insider-Trading Probe, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1997,
at A4; Two Men Indicted on Charges Relating to Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1997, at
B7A; Dean Starkman and Anita Raghavan, Some Street "Police" May Need Policing, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 10, 1997, at B9; SEC Charges Seven with Insider Trading in Stock of Cephalon, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 26, 1997, at A4; Jon G. Auerbach & Laura Johannes, Former CEO of Centennial Faces
Charges, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1997, at A6; Matthew Benjamin, 'Mystery' Traders Must Pay $2.8
Million in Case Involving Gillette-Duracell Deal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1997, at B6; Real Estate
Investor Convicted of Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at D4; Amy Barrett, Insider
Trading, Bus. W., Dec. 12, 1994, at 70.
3. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 629-34 (1984). The authors note that despite promoting the allocational
efficiency of information, any perceived benefits derived from insider trading is negligible. Id.
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Congress has acknowledged insider trading to be problematic in terms
of the unfairness it creates in the securities markets.4 In response to
this unfairness, Congress promulgated a broad sanction regime.5 Part
of this sanction regime is the misappropriation theory of criminal
liability arising under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule
See also James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the Chicago School,
1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 658-59 (arguing that to allow company managers to trade on inside
information would be to allow managers to reap compensation for which they had not contracted,
and would also allow for a form of compensation to which owners would never agree); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of
Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 364 (arguing that, analyzed in terms of the "use-verses-
creation," allowing management to trade on inside information as part of an incentive package
creates a perverse incentive). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 417-
18 (4th ed. 1992). Posner, unlike Easterbrook, argues that allowing managers to trade on inside
information makes managers less risk averse and promotes the allocational efficiency of
information. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
(1966).
4. See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES
FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 8 (1988) reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6045 [hereinafter I.T.S.F.E.A.] ("[T]he far greater number of commentators
support efforts to curb insider trading, viewing such efforts as crucial to the capital formation
process that depends on investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of our securities
markets."); HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT
OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275
[hereinafter I.T.S.A.] ("Insider trading threatens these markets by undermining the public's
expectations of honest and fair securities markets where all participants play by the same rules.").
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994) [hereinafter § 10(b)]. This section states, in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
exchange, ... (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
See also 15 U.S.C. § 78 p (1994) [hereinafter § 16(b)]. Section 7 8 p states:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within
any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in
connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or
officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not
repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months.
See generally Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market
Microstructure Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1
(1993). Georgakopoulos provides an excellent overview of § 10(b) and the various theories of Rule
10b-5 liability. See also Donald C. Cook & Myer Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities
Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385 (1953). Despite the age of this article, the authors, both
past members of the Securities and Exchange Commission, provide an excellent overview of how
§ 16(b) functions.
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10b-5.' This Note argues that broadening the present embezzlement
model of the Rule 1Ob- 5 misappropriation theory will more fully reflect
both the language and intent of § 10(b) (of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act) and Rule 10b-5, and more importantly accommodate
the sophistication of today's insider trading schemes. Part II of this
Note examines the uses of inside information both prior to and after
the creation of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, and how § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 were created to proscribe these uses. Part III examines the
language and intent behind § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and argues that
their language and intent legitimates a broader sanction regime which
is necessary to combat the present sophistication of insider trading.
Part IV examines the criticisms of the present embezzlement model of
the Rule 1ob-5 misappropriation theory as expressed by Justices Scalia
and Thomas,7 and shows how a broader form of criminal liability is
necessary despite these criticisms.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE RULE 1OB-5
MISAPPROPRIATION MODEL
While § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 arose as a part of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act and from the SEC's regulative power
respectively, the misappropriation theory of Rule 10b-5 arose as a
product of case law.'
The sanction regime of § 10(b) and Rule 1ob-5 arose as a response
to massive investor losses before and shortly after the stock market
crash of 1929.' After the crash, stock exchanges, particularly the New
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997) [hereinafter Rule 10b-5]. This rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
7. See generally United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997) (finding Rule 10b-5
criminal liability for an attorney who traded on inside information obtained by breaching a
fiduciary duty owed to a client).
8. The lack of congressional or SEC codification of the misappropriation theory has
generated criticisms of this model. These criticisms will be examined in Part II.
9. See S. REP. No. 73-47, at 2 (1933) ("Those who have considered the matter place .
losses in this country at $1,700,000,000 annually even before the depression."); H.R. REP. No.
73-85, at 2 (1933) ("Fully half or $25,000,000,000 worth of securities floated during this period
(post-World War I) have been proved to be worthless."). See generally 77 CONG. REC. 2930
1998]
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York Stock Exchange, made attempts at self-regulation. ° Specifically,
the exchanges attempted to regulate fraud perpetrated on investors."
These attempts at self-regulation, however, failed,' 2  prompting
Congress to begin a series of widely supported 3 investigations into
stock market practices."
These congressional investigations revealed that inside information
was a vehicle by which fraud was perpetrated on investors. For
example, inside information allowed for the creation of stock pools.'"
Stock pools were considered fraudulent in that pools induced investors
outside the pools to invest through the creation of fictitious activity.'6
The Senate received testimony regarding the creation of a pool to
manipulate RCA stock.'7 The members of the pool were the presi-
dent of RCA, his wife, the president of M.J. Meehan & Co. (a
brokerage firm), his wife, and a number of others.'" The members
of the pool sought to manipulate the price of RCA stock though the
(1933) (citing the $1,700,000,000 figure as annual losses in the stock market); THE COM. AND
FIN. CHRON., May 6, 1933, at 3043 (citing the $25,000,000,000 figure as losses incurred in the
stock market over the prior ten year period).
10. See THE COM. AND FIN. CHRON., Aug. 5, 1933, at 911 ("Unqualified approval must
be given to the action of the New York Stock Exchange in taking steps to curb reckless
speculation for the future.").
11. See 77 CONG. REC. 3223 (1933) ("The bill is aimed to put a stop to certain fraudulent
practices.").
12. See, e.g., Peter Helmoop Noyes, Wall Street Plays Possum, THE NATION, Jan. 31, 1934,
at 133; THE NATION, Jan. 3, 1934, at 2 (citing examples of how, despite the New York Stock
Exchange's attempts at self regulation, fraud and manipulation still occurred).
13. See 78 CONG. REC. 8176-8185 (1934) (citing letters from Congressional constituents
supporting securities reform). See also For Stock Exchange Control, BARRON'S, Feb. 5, 1934, at
4 (discussing how securities reform made up part of Democratic platform for the 1932 presidential
elections); THE COM. AND FIN. CHRON., Apr. 1, 1933, at 2108 (describing Roosevelt's position
regarding securities reform as: "He is happy in his phraseology when he says that his proposal
adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor the further doctrine 'Let the seller also beware."'). Cf.
77 CONG. REc. 4444 (1933) (Senator McAdoo of California attempting to distance himself from
profits made through stock speculation).
14. See 77 CONG. REc. 1101 (1933) (outlining the purpose of the Senate investigations into
stock market activities).
15. See generally S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 31 (1934) (defining pools as: "an agreement
between several people, usually more than three, to actively trade in a single security. ... The
purpose of a pool generally is to raise the price of a security by concerted activity on the part of
pool members, and thereby to enable them to unload their holdings at a profit upon the public
attracted by the activity ... ").
16. Id. at 32 ("The testimony before the Senate subcommittee again and again demonstrated
that the activity fomented by a pool creates a false and deceptive appearance of genuine demand
for the security on the part of the purchasing public and attracts persons relying upon this
misleading appearance to make purchases.").
17. See 77 CONG. REC. 3224-25 (1933).
18. Id.
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creation of massive short-term volatility.19 In one week the pool
made $4,924,073.27.20
Congress created § 16(b) in response to pools and other forms of
fraudulent activities.2' Section 16(b) made it illegal for a beneficial
owner (one who owns or is the beneficiary of at least ten percent of a
corporation's stock), a director, or an officer of a corporation to buy or
sell the securities of any issuing corporation with which they have one
of the aforementioned relationships within a six-month period.22
While § 16(b) covered individuals such as the president of RCA, it
failed to cover individuals such as the wife of the president of RCA
and other persons.23 Criminal liability for these outsiders was created
in the form of Rule 10b-5 via the SEC's § 10(b) enforcement power.24
In short, Rule 10b-5 acted to fill the gaps in § 16(b).
In 1942 the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-525 as a fraud catch-
all.26 The catch-all nature of Rule 10b-5 is reflected in the SEC's
comments on the first application of Rule 10b-5: "These anti-fraud
provisions are not intended as a specification of particular acts or
practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass
the infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken
of investors and others."27 It is clear from the above passage that the
SEC was concerned with advantage being taken of investors and others.
It is the category of "others" and the creation of criminal liability for
19. Id. In the course of one week, 1,493,400 shares of RCA stock were traded. Id.
20. Id.
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p.
22. See 78 CONG. REC. 11006-11007 (1934). See also Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594-595 (1973) (outlining the "pragmatic test" for § 16(b)
liability). See generally Karl Shumpei Okamoto, Oversimplification and the SEC's Treatment of
Derivative Securities Trading by Corporate Insiders, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1287, 1312. Okamoto
argues that the present day expansion of § 16(b) liability to derivatives constitutes an overly broad
application of § 16(b) which in fact harms some types of otherwise beneficial trading. Id.
23. See, e.g., Peter Helmoop Noyes, The Public Returns to Wall Street, THE NATION, May
31, 1933, at 616 (defining beneficiaries of inside information as "[d]irectors and officials of
companies or their friends [who] profit from advance information before it becomes public.").
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (outlining the SEC's enforcement power under § 10(b)).
25. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
26. See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (declining to find 10b-
5 criminal liability for the employee of a print shop who used inside information gained in the
course of printing documents to trade on securities.). See also James H. Schropp et al., Liability
for Insider Trading Under the Federal Securities Laws, 525 P.L.I./CORP. 139, 262 (1986)
(describing § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as a catch-all clause to enable the Commission "to deal with
new manipulative [or cunning] devices" (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203
(1976)).
27. In re Cady, Roberts and Co., No. 8-3925, 1961 WL 3743, at *3 (SEC Nov. 8, 1961).
1998]
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the purposes of protecting this category of persons which has created
the most controversy regarding Rule 10b-5.
28
There are two theories of Rule 10b-5 criminal liability.29  The
traditional theory sanctions individuals who trade on inside information
obtained in the course of a fiduciary relationship with shareholders."
There are two ways in which an outsider can have a fiduciary
relationship with shareholders. 1 First, a fiduciary relationship can
arise where an insider discloses information to an individual and the
individual knows, or should have known, that the disclosure is a breach
of a fiduciary duty.2  This is known as "tippee liability."33  An
example of Rule 10b-5 tippee liability would be the case of the wife of
the president of RCA, who would be liable in that she received inside
information34 from a fiduciary of the company (her husband, the
president) and traded on this information.35
Second, a fiduciary duty can arise where an outsider obtains access
to confidential information via a fiduciary relationship with a company
or its shareholders. 6  This is known as temporary insider liability. 7
Temporary insider liability can be illustrated by the case of an attorney
who receives inside information in the course of her relationship with
a corporate client and trades on this information. 8
The fraud in these examples arises from the fact that the wife via
the husband, and the attorney via her employment relationship with
28. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). But see United States v.
Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
29. See generally United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564-567 (2d Cir. 1991)
(declining to find Rule 10b-5 criminal misappropriation liability for a stockbroker who obtained
inside information from a client).
30. Id. at 564.
31. Id. at 565.
32. Id.
33. Id. See also United States v. Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding Rule
lob-5 insider liability for Ruggiero, an auditor for a company, and tippee liability for Ruggiero's
codefendant Parker, to whom Ruggiero gave inside information).
34. While it is unclear whether knowledge of the creation of a stock pool by insiders would
be considered inside information for the purposes of Rule 10b-5 liability, it is clear that such an
argument is plausible. See, e.g., Mylett, 97 F.3d at 667 (finding that materiality is determined
through "a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur, and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity" (quoting Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988)).
35. See Ruggiero, 56 F.3d at 655. See generally Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567-570 (defining
tippee liability arising in marital relations).
36. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 565.
37. Id.
38. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 565.
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the corporation, maintain the pretext of having a relationship of trust
and confidence with the shareholders of a company.
The second theory of Rule 10b-5 criminal liability is the
misappropriation theory. The misappropriation theory sanctions
individuals who trade on inside information gained in the course of a
fiduciary relationship with another party.39  Specifically, criminal
liability under the misappropriation theory occurs when one willfully
misappropriates material nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary
duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence, and uses that
information in a securities transaction.4" Unlike the traditional
theory, the misappropriation theory does not require a breach of
fiduciary duty to a shareholder, but rather requires a breach of
fiduciary duty to some party in the course of obtaining inside
information.4 For example, in United States v. Willis,42 the district
court refused to dismiss the indictment of a psychiatrist who traded on
inside information obtained from a patient.4 3 The court found that
the relationship between a treating psychiatrist and his patient is an
inherently fiduciary relationship.44  Similarly, in United States v.
Reed,4" the district court refused to dismiss the indictment of the son
of an insider who obtained inside information from his father and
proceeded to trade on this inside information.46 The court found that
a fiduciary relationship existed where the defendant's father expected
the issues discussed between the father and son to remain confiden-
tial.47 In short, these cases illustrate that the source of inside infor-
mation is irrelevant for the purposes of determining Rule 10b-5
criminal liability because criminal liability is ascertained by determin-
ing whether a fiduciary duty was breached during the course of
obtaining inside information.
Congress has given tacit approval to the misappropriation
theory.48 Apparent congressional approval of the misappropriation
39. Id. at 566.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
43. Id. at 209.
44. Id.
45. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
46. Id. at 737.
47. Id. at 690.
48. See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING AND SECURI-
TIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 10 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6047 ("[T]he misappropriation theory clearly remains valid in the
Second Circuit .. .but is unresolved nationally. In the view of the Committee, however, this
type of security fraud should be encompassed within Section 10(b), and Rule 1ob-5.").
3171998]
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theory is expressed in Congress's rejection of attempts to reform Rule
10b-5 by creating more definite types of criminal liability.49 In
particular, Congress has resisted attempts to define insider trading, a
step that would limit the scope of the misappropriation theory by
creating a bright-line rule as to what constitutes criminal liability for
insider trading. °
Congressional resistance to defining insider trading in part can be
attributed to the increased sophistication of insider trading over the
past fifteen years. For example, in 1986, Ivan Boesky paid a
$150,000,000 penalty to the SEC for insider trading.5  Boesky
engaged in an insider trading scheme whereby Boesky traded on inside
information gained through companies he controlled. 2 Congress
responded to this increased sophistication by creating the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (hereinafter
I.T.S.F.E.A.)."3  Among other things, 4  the I.T.S.F.E.A. created
49. See 133 CONG. REC. S8246-52 (1987) (proposing but eventually rejecting the Insider
Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987 to be codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p [hereinafter I.T.P.A.]).
The I.T.P.A. stated, in part:
(b)(1) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use material, non-
public information to purchase or sell any security, by the use of any means or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facilities of any
national securities exchange ... if such person knows or is reckless in not knowing that
such information has been obtained wrongfully, or if the purchase or sale of such
security would constitute a wrongful use of such information .... [I]nformation shall
have been used or obtained wrongfully only if it has been obtained by, or its use would
constitute, directly, or indirectly, theft, conversion, misappropriation or a breach of any
fiduciary, contractual, employment, personal, or other relationship of trust and
confidence.
50. See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING AND
SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988, H.R. No. 100-910, at 11 (1988), reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6048 ("[T]he Committee nevertheless declined to include a statutory
definition. . . . [T]he Committee did not believe that the lack of consensus over the proper
delineation of an insider trading definition should impede progress on the needed enforcement
reforms .. "). See also Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider
Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 366 (1989). O'Connor argues
that the general standards of Rule 10b-5 in conjunction with severe penalties deter through
creating an in terrorem effect. Id.
51. SEC v. Boesky, Litig. Rel. No. 11288, 1986 WL 15283, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
1986). See also SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., No. 88. Civ. 6209, 1989 WL 90165, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989) (Drexel agreeing to pay a $350,000,000 penalty for insider trading
violations). See generally Settlements Are Approved in Suits Against Boesky, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11,
1997, at B8.
52. See Boesky, 1986 WL 15283, at *1.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1994).
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(e) (1994). The statue creates a bounty system as follows:
"[T]here shall be paid from amounts imposed as a penalty under this section and recovered by
the Commission or the Attorney General, such sums, not to exceed 10 percent of such amounts
... to the person or persons who provide information leading to the imposition of such penalty."
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controlling person liability5 to stop insider trading schemes similar
to the one employed by Boesky. The misappropriation theory met this
ever increasing sophistication of insider trading by creating criminal
liability for the breach of any fiduciary duty committed in the course
of obtaining inside information. The creation of criminal liability for
the breach of any fiduciary duty 6 allows for broad sanction power.
It is this same broad sanction power which has made the misappropria-
tion theory a target of criticism.
While Congress has given its tacit approval to the misappropria-
tion theory, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
O'Hagan"7 the federal courts were split on supporting the theory."8
The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits supported the misappropria-
tion theory, while the Fourth and Eighth Circuits declined to support
it. 9 United States v. Newman illustrates the rationale of the circuits
supporting the misappropriation theory.60 In Newman, the Court held
that a defendant could be criminally liable under 10b-5 for trading on
inside information despite the fact that the defendant did not have a
fiduciary relationship with a buyer or seller of securities.6 The court
reasoned the Rule 10b-5 phrase "any person in connection with"
permitted such criminal liability to accrue to persons who misappropri-
ated inside information gained from any source regardless of whether
that source was a buyer or seller of securities.62 The only caveat to
this broad theory of criminal liability was that a defendant must have
a fiduciary duty to the source of the inside information.63 In short,
under the court's analysis in Newman, the phrase "any person" meant
that any person with a fiduciary duty to the source of inside informa-
Id.
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(3) (1994) ("The amount of the penalty which may be imposed
on any person who, at the time of the violation, directly or indirectly controlled the person who
committed such violation, shall be determined by the court .....
56. See, e.g., Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566.
57. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
58. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 620-21 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
2199 (1997). See generally Roger Lowenstein, Insider Trading: Oughta Be a Law, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 27, 1997, at Cl.
59. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 620-21.
60. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding Rule lob-5 criminal misappropriation liability for
a stockbroker who traded on inside information gained in breach of a third party's duty of
confidentiality). See also Mylett, 97 F.3d at 667 (affirming defendant's conviction based upon the
misappropriation theory); 2 Settle AT&T Insider Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1997, at D9.
61. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 16.
62. See id. at 18.
63. See id. See also Mylett, 97 F.3d at 667 ("[T]he only additional showing needed to
establish misappropriation is that the information was acquired through a breach of a relationship
of trust and confidence.").
1998]
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tion may be held criminally liable if the person trades on inside
information gained in the course of a fiduciary relationship.64
Newman's broad "any person in connection with" interpretation
served as the basis for criticism of the misappropriation theory. United
States v. Bryan65 illustrates the rationale of the circuits rejecting the
misappropriation theory, holding that one cannot be found criminally
liable under the misappropriation theory where a fiduciary duty is not
owed to either a purchaser or seller of securities.66 The court stated
that the misappropriation theory transforms Rule 10b-5 from a rule
intended to govern and protect relationships between market partici-
pants into a federal common law governing and protecting any and all
trust relationships.67 Accordingly, the Bryan court found the misap-
propriation theory overly broad by virtue of its creation of criminal
liability for all breaches of fiduciary duty committed in the course of
obtaining information upon which to trade securities.68
In United States v. O'Hagan,69 the Eighth Circuit added to the
Bryan court's rejection of the misappropriation theory the additional
criticism that the plain text of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 does not support
the misappropriation theory insofar as the misappropriation theory fails
to require criminal liability to be based upon deception, a requirement
64. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 18.
65. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (declining to find criminal Rule lOb-S misappropriation
liability for head of West Virginia state lottery who traded on inside information gained in the
course of employment). See generally Jay G. Merwin, Jr., Misappropriation Theory Liability Awaits
a Clear Signal, 51 BUS. LAW. 803 (1996) (discussing the impact of the Bryan decision on Rule
lob-5 case law).
66. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 952.
67. Id. at 950. See generally id. at 949 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-
74 (1977), to support the argument that a breach of a fiduciary duty, even in connection with a
purchase or sale of securities, does not give rise to liability under lOb-5 absent deception); id. at
953 (arguing that the misappropriation theory is redundant insofar as it criminalizes activities
already covered under the mail or wire fraud statutes).
68. See generally Timothy J. Horman, Comment, In Defense of United States v. Bryan: Why
the Misappropriation Theory Is Indefensible, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2493 (1996). Horman
makes five arguments against the misappropriation theory: (1) the text of§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-S
do not support liability based upon the misappropriation theory; (2) the legislative history do not
evince a Congressional intent in favor of the theory; (3) the use of the misappropriation theory
contravenes Supreme Court precedent; (4) application of the misappropriation theory has been
inconsistent and unpredictable; and (5) sufficient alternatives exist to capture the illegal behavior
encompassed by the misappropriation theory. Id. But see Marc Mellett, Comment, Is There Life
After Bryan?: The Validity of Rule lOb-5's Misappropriation Theory, 34 DtJQ. L. REV. 1057, 1081
(1996) (arguing that both the language and history of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 support the
misappropriation theory).
69. 92 F.3d at 612. See generally John Gibeaut, The Real Insiders: SEC May Take
Securities Trading Issues to the Supreme Court, 83 A.B.A. J. 42 (Jan. 1997) (discussing the
implications of the Eighth Circuit's decision).
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that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 mandate.7" Specifically, the O'Hagan
court stated that the misappropriation theory fails because it does not
require a particularized showing of misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure.7' Rather, the misappropriation theory finds criminal liability for
a breach of a fiduciary duty in connection with any person, regardless
of whether this person is a buyer or seller of securities.72  Thus, in
O'Hagan the Eighth Circuit added the criticism that the misappropria-
tion theory allows for criminal liability to accrue where there has been
no particularized showing of fraud or deceit.
On appeal, the Supreme Court accommodated the Eighth Circuit's
criticisms in O'Hagan by moving away from emphasizing breach of
fiduciary duty as a basis for Rule 10b-5 misappropriation liability and
moving toward an emphasis on deceptive device as central to Rule
10b-5 misappropriation liability.73  Under the Supreme Court's
analysis in O'Hagan, deception is seen as akin to embezzlement,7 4 and
exists irrespective of whether the party is deceiving a buyer or seller of
securities.7" In citing embezzlement as a model for the particular type
of deceptive practice Rule 10b-5 seeks to sanction, the Court was able
to meet the Eighth Circuit's criticisms. Accordingly, under the
Supreme Court's O'Hagan analysis, one is liable via the misappropria-
tion theory of Rule 10b-5 where one's conduct involves a willful76
breach of a fiduciary duty via a deceptive device or contrivance used
in connection with the obtaining of nonpublic material information in
the purchase or sale of a security.
77
In many ways, the embezzlement model outlined by the Supreme
Court in O'Hagan is an extension of the theft model of the misappro-
priation theory of Rule 10b-5. Supporters of the misappropriation
theory often cite Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Chiarella
v. United States78 for the proposition that the misappropriation theory
70. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617.
71. Id. at 618.
72. See id. at 619 ("[Tjhe misappropriation theory which allows the imposition of § 10(b)
liability even though no market participant was deceived or defrauded cannot be defended.").
73. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 ("§ 10(b) is not an all-purpose breach of fiduciary duty
ban; rather, it trains on conduct involving manipulation or deception.").
74. See id. at 2208 (defining embezzlement as "the fraudulent appropriation to one's own
use of the money or goods entrusted to one's care by another" (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S.
181, 189 (1902)).
75. Id. at 2206-07.
76. Id. at 2214.
77. Id. at 2209.
78. 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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seeks to sanction theft of information.79 Theft, however, is a very
broad term covering a variety of illegal acts.8" The type of theft
Chief Justice Burger referred to in Chiarella was larceny, since the
defendant in Chiarella attempted to exercise control (i.e., asportation)
over another's property in violation of that person's property rights. 1
Specifically, the defendant in Chiarella attempted to exercise control
over property in the form of information. 2 Theft as larceny, howev-
er, is atypical in terms of the fact patterns to which it can been applied.
Most fact patterns where the misappropriation theory is applied involve
deception and fraud at the front end of a relationship serving as a
pretext for one to gain possession of inside information. 3 Prior to
O'Hagan, the debate surrounding the misappropriation theory centered
on the goal of the theory in terms of what it sought to sanction. 4
The Supreme Court's O'Hagan decision resolved in the negative the
issue of whether theft as larceny alone could serve as the basis for
criminal liability, for the Supreme Court found that the existence of
deceptive practices was an integral part of Rule 1 Ob- 5 misappropriation
79. See Stephen D. Susman, Private Remedies for Insider Trading, 270 PLI/LIT 605, 623
(1984); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 ("In sum, the evidence shows beyond all doubt that Chiarella,
working literally in the shadows of the warnings signs in the print shop misappropriated-stole
to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost confidence.");
Donald C. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effects on Existing Law,
37 VAND. L. REV. 1273 (1984) (citing the I.T.S.A. for the proposition that Congress considers
the trading on inside information as a type of theft); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis,
Family Ties, Tippees and the Chestman Decision: Time for a Principled Definition of Insider
Trading, 4 No. 7 INSIGHTS 7, 9 (1990) (citing the statements of an assistant U.S. Attorney that
the misappropriation theory is a type of theft crime).
80. See generally SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES 1088-1090 (6th ed. 1995). The authors cite various theft consolidation statutes,
which consolidate crimes known at common law as larceny, embezzlement, and theft by decep-
tion/larceny by trick, but which today are generally known as theft.
81. See id. at 1043.
82. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 244-45 (Chiarella stated, "I looked at the these various
documents and I deciphered them and I decoded them and I used that information as a basis for
purchasing stock."). See also O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208 (citing confidential information as a
form of property).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (defendant traded
on inside information gained under the pretext that he was victim's psychiatrist); United States
v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (defendant traded on inside information gained under
the pretext that he was obtaining the inside information as part of his role as the son of victim).
But see, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding civil liability under the
misappropriation theory for acts that were theft-like, but not fraudulent).
84. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208, n.6. See generally Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-46
(arguing that Rule 10b-5 should sanction any type of misappropriation or theft of inside
information); Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading
on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 122 (1984). Aldave states: "When one
simply steals information from a stranger, his trading on the information does not involve
deception or fraud, and therefore should not be held to violate Rule 10b-5." Id.
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liability."5 That decision, however, creates the potential for a new
debate regarding Rule 10b-5. Namely, O'Hagan raises the issue of
which model 6 should be implemented to sanction the types of
deceptive, fraudulent practices that are used as a pretext to obtain
inside information. 7
III. THE LANGUAGE AND INTENT BEHIND THE § 10(B) REGIME
The language and intent behind § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can
support a broad notion of criminal liability. While the Court in
O'Hagan looked to an embezzlement model of criminal liability to
define the scope of liability under the misappropriation theory, the
language and wording of both § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can support a
broader form of liability. This broader form of liability could be
expressed as a theft by deception model of the Rule 10b-5 misappro-
priation theory. The present sophistication of insider trading
legitimates this broader sanction regime.
Unlike the embezzlement model, the theft by deception model
accurately reflects both the language and intent behind the § 10(b)
regime. The intent was first expressed in Congressional statements
regarding the purposes of the investigations into stock exchange
practices. Specifically, one of the purposes was stated as: "To make
a thorough, and complete investigation ... [of] the desirability of
limiting or prohibiting the use of the mails, the telegraph, the
telephone, and any other facilities of interstate commerce or communi-
cation with respect to any such operations, and practices deemed
fraudulent, or contrary to the public interest.""8  This passage
illustrates congressional concern with fraudulent practices and practices
contrary to the public interest. This concern is reflected in the
language of § 10(b): "It shall be unlawful for any person .. .[t]o use
or employ .. any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." 9 It is also reflected in Rule 10b-5: "It shall
be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . . [t]o engage in
85. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2211. See also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245.
86. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2221 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's
embezzlement analogy).
87. See id. at 2208 (describing the targets of the misappropriation theory as those who
"pretend loyalty to the principle while secretly converting the principal's information for personal
gain").
88. 77 CONG. REc. 1101 (1933).
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
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any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security."9 The broad wording of § 10(b), reflected in
the equally broad wording of Rule 10b-5, points to a congressional
intent for the § 10(b) regime to cover a variety of deceptive practic-
es.91  Thus, it can be inferred that Congress intended criminal
liability under the § 10(b) regime where one uses any type of fraud92
as a pretext to gain possession of inside information to be used in a
securities transaction."3
There are two common law models for sanctioning what could
loosely be termed the fraudulent, deceptive misappropriation of
property in the form of inside information. The first model is
embezzlement. In O'Hagan, the Supreme Court defined embezzlement
as the fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of money or goods
entrusted to one's care by another.94 The creation of embezzlement
as a common law crime can be seen as a response to the deficiencies of
larceny. Larceny only sanctioned the asportation of an owner's
property in violation of an owner's property rights.95  Where,
however, one is given permission by an owner to take property and
that person takes the property, but uses it for purposes other than that
for which permission was granted (for example, the party converts the
property for personal use, rather than use for the benefit of the owner),
it cannot be said that that person committed larceny.96 Thus, the
90. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
91. See generally O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209-10 (describing the goal of prohibiting decep-
tion as maintaining fairness and honesty in the markets). Cf. lcman Anabtawi, Note, Toward a
Definition of Insider Trading, 41 STAN. L. REV. 377, 387-90 (1989). Anabtawi argues for an
economic purpose to the prohibitions on deceptive practices used to obtain inside information.
Insider trading has the effect of driving risk averse participants out of the market by virtue of the
fact that these participants are less willing to invest where there is less certainty regarding the true
price of stock. The upshot of fewer market participants is an increase in the cost of capital. Id.
92. See Nat Stern, The Constitutionalization of Rule lob-5, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 13-14
(1995). Stern argues that the use of the word "any" in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-S supports a broad,
sweeping interpretation of both § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Stern states: "Nothing could be plainer
about § 10(b) than its breadth: it forbids the use of 'any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance' in violation of SEC rules governing exchange of securities. This categorical
prohibition, implemented by Rule lOb-5, expresses a sweeping ban on fraudulent trading
activities .... [T]here is no reason to doubt that § 10(b) means exactly what it says." Id.
93. See O'Hagan, 117 . Ct. at 2208 ("[M]isappropriators ... deal in deception. A
fiduciary who '[pretends] loyalty to the principle while secretly converting the principle's
information for personal gain' . . . 'dupes' or defrauds the principle.").
94. Id.
95. See generally KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 80, at 1042-43.
96. See id. at 1045-48. See generally George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89
HARV. L. REV. 469, 492-94 (1976). Fletcher describes the import of the lack of a trespassory
taking as it pertains to larceny by citing the case of Topolewski v. State, 109 N.W. 1037 (Wis.
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common law crime of embezzlement97 was created to fill the gaps in
larceny by expanding liability to the fraudulent conversion of property.
The second model is theft by deception. Theft by deception98
is a modern embodiment of the common law crime of false pretens-
es. 99 False pretenses occurs where one obtains both possession of and
title to another person's property through deception. °° Deception,
for the purpose of false pretenses, is the misrepresentation of some
existing fact.' The definition of deception used in theft by decep-
tion is more expansive than the common law definition of deception
used in false pretenses. Specifically, theft by deception covers
deception involving the creation of false impressions of law, value, or
intention.0 2 Thus, theft by deception covers almost any type of
deceptive practice used to obtain possession of another person's
property.
1906). In Topoleski, the defendant's conviction for larceny was reversed on the grounds that the
owner of the allegedly stolen goods had given permission to the defendant to take the goods.
97. See generally JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY 37-40 (2d ed. 1952). Hall
describes the first embezzlement statutes as covering servants embezzling their master's property,
brokers, merchants, bankers, attorneys and other agents misappropriating property entrusted to
them, parties fraudulently pledging goods entrusted to them for sale, trustees under express trusts
fraudulently disposing of trust funds, and bailees stealing goods bailed to them. Id.
98. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3(1) (1962). The Model Penal Code defines theft by
deception as occurring when a person purposefully obtains property of another by deception. A
person deceives if he purposely:
(1) creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impression as to law, value,
intention or other state of mind; but deception as to a person's intention to perform
a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently
perform the promise; or
(2) prevents another from acquiring information which would affect his judgment of
a transaction; or
(3) fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or
reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom he
stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.
99. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 cmt. 1 (1962).
100. See People v. Ashley, 267 P.2d 271, 279 (Cal. 1954) ("Larceny by trick and device is
the appropriation of property, the possession of which was fraudulently acquired; obtaining
property by false pretenses is the fraudulent or deceitful acquisition both of title and possession.");
see also Arthur R. Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 987 (1953). Pearce
compares the crimes of false pretenses and larceny by trick. "False pretenses is theft by deceit.
The misappropriation it punishes must be effected by communication to the owner. Larceny by
trick is theft by stealth. It punishes misappropriation effected by unauthorized disposition of the
owner's property. The former focuses on defendant's behavior while face to face with the owner.
• . . The focus of the latter is upon defendant's behavior behind the owner's back." Id.
101. See generally United States v. Durland, 161 U.S. 306, 312-313 (1895) (arguing that
federal mail and wire fraud statutes act to encompass common law false pretenses, and in fact are
broader in scope).
102. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3(1).
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Neither the wording of, nor the congressional intent behind, the
§ 10(b) regime reflect the notion that criminal liability for violations of
the § 10(b) regime is limited to breaches of fiduciary duty. °3  The
fiduciary duty element of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory as
expressed in the embezzlement model is a product not of congressional
intent, but rather SEC rule-making authority under § 10(b).1 °4 The
roots of the fiduciary duty element can be traced to the fiduciary duty
that exists between a corporate director or officer and the corporation's
beneficiaries in the form of shareholders."0 ' The problem with the
fiduciary duty element is that the wording, and in particular the
congressional intent, behind the § 10(b) regime reflect a broader notion
of liability. Specifically, the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 reflect
the creation of a broad sanctioning power to control any type of
deceptive pretext used to gain property in the form of inside informa-
tion. 1°  Theft by deception reflects similar breadth by virtue of its
use of language seeking to sanction deception involving the creation of
false impressions as to law, value, or intention.0 Accordingly, while
the embezzlement model limits liability to breaches of fiduciary duty,
the § 10(b) regime's language and intent to proscribe any deceptive
device or fraudulent practice"0 ' is better reflected in the theft by
deception model.
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Both § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 use broad
wording that seeks to proscribe any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance used in
connection with a securities transaction.
104. See generally In re Cady, Roberts and Co., No. 8-3925, 1961 WL 3743, at *5 (SEC
Nov. 8, 1961).
Although the primary function of Rule 10b-5 was to extend a remedy to a defrauded
seller, the courts and this Commission have held that it is also applicable to a defrauded
buyer. There is no valid reason why persons who purchase stock from an officer,
director, or other person having the responsibilities of an 'insider' should not have the
same protection afforded by disclosure of special information as persons who sell stock
to them. Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law based on the view
that an officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders
from whom he purchases but not to members of the public to whom he sells, it is
clearly not appropriate to introduce these into the broader antifraud concepts embodied
in the securities acts.
Id.
105. See generally id. n.23.
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j. Section 10(b) allows the SEC to promulgate rules as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest to proscribe any manipulative device or contrivance in
contravention of SEC rules and regulations.
107. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3(1). It is clear that, of these three proscriptions, false
impression as to intention would be the most relevant for the purposes of the § 10(b) regime.




The fiduciary duty element of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation
theory fails to address both of the ways that a deceptive pretext can be
used to obtain inside information in a nonfiduciary context and the
pervasive nature of insider trading.1"9 Today, fact patterns exist
involving the use of deception as a pretext for transfers of inside
information that do not involve a fiduciary relationship. For example,
in United States v. Cherif,"° the defendant, a former bank employee,
convinced his girlfriend, a current employee at the bank, to create a
fictitious memo allowing the defendant access to the bank's specialized
finance department. Through his ability to access the specialized
finance department, the defendant was able to gain confidential
information regarding client companies' future business strategy,
management structure, and financial performance."' The deceptive
pretext used in this case arose not from the breach of a fiduciary duty,
but rather from the perpetration of an outright fraud on the possessor
of the information (i.e., the bank). Thus, there are instances in which
the fiduciary duty element is outstripped as a sanctional tool by the
sophistication of those employing deceptive pretexts.
Insider trading becomes pervasive by virtue of the "word of
mouth" dissemination of inside information. In Cherif, the Court
noted the word of mouth phenomenon when it observed that "Cherif
was not the only person to profit from trading on the information he
obtained from the bank. Cherif shared the information with (possibly
among others) William Bronec, Jr. Bronec had been a fellow employee
of Cherif's ... and was one of Cherif's best friends."'1 2  The
phenomenon of sharing fraudulently obtained inside information with
others through word of mouth is nothing new,"' and has been
heavily documented in the media."4
One example of the word of mouth phenomenon is the case of
Susan Keary, Graeme Davies, Jeffrey Morris, and Gerard Murphy.
Keary was an administrative assistant to Benjamin Lambert, a member
of the board of directors of Hilton Hotels."' While at a New York
City bar, Keary met Davies, a businessman from Liverpool, England.
Keary traveled to Liverpool to visit Davies and was introduced to a
109. See supra note 2.
110. 943 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1991).
111. Id. at 694.
112. Id. at 695.
113. See supra note 23.
114. Nick Gilbert, Word of Mouth: Apparent Insider Trading in Hilton Hotels Leads Back
to a Director's Secretary, FIN. WORLD, May 9, 1995, at 38.
115. Id. at 39.
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man named Gerard, later discovered to be Gerard Murphy. One of
Murphy's business associates was Morris, a Leeds, England, business-
man." 6 Keary left Liverpool on November 14, 1994, telling Davies
that she had to return to New York to make arrangements for her boss,
Lambert, to attend a Hilton board meeting. During this same period,
Hilton was contemplating "ways to enhance shareholder value,"
meaning that Hilton Hotels was potentially looking to sell." 7 This
information was not public; it was only known to a select group of
insiders such as Lambert. On November 15th, Keary spoke to Davies.
On that same day, Morris began to buy Hilton call options and
common stock." 8 Morris gorged himself on Hilton options, buying
595 out of 597 options traded on November 15th.1"9 Keary again
spoke to Davis on November 17th, and on that same day Murphy and
Morris executed their options and sold their stock. During the period
between November 15th and 17th, the day Hilton announced they
were looking for ways to enhance shareholder value, Hilton stock shot
up $10, netting Murphy and Morris a combined profit of
$425,000.121 Murphy and Morris were not the only ones who
benefited from the inside information they obtained; Murphy's mother,
wife, two sisters, and brother-in-law also profited.' 2' The SEC
brought a civil action against Murphy, who failed to respond to service
of process. A default judgment was entered against him, resulting in
the seizure of $301,000 in profits and a $157,000 fine. 122 Morris has
eluded SEC prosecution. 23
While this may be an extreme example, it reflects the way that
word of mouth is used as a vehicle to disseminate inside information
obtained through a deceptive pretext. Word of mouth dissemination
of inside information is largely unseen and is hard to sanction. 124
Typically, inside information disseminated through word of mouth is
exchanged via a "friend of a friend,"' 2 5 and only a small portion of
116. Id.
117. Id. at 38.
118. Id. at 39.
119. Id. at 40.
120. Gilbert, supra note 114, at 38.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. Neither Keary, Davies, nor Lambert faced SEC prosecution since they did not
trade on the inside information obtained.
124. Michael Schroeder & Amy Barrett, A Bigger Stick Against Insider Traders: Will Faster
Tracking and More Criminal Charges Stem the Tide?, Bus. W., May 27, 1996, at 34.
125. Id. at 35.
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parties exchanging information in this manner are caught.126 More-
over, the civil penalties are small, normally constituting a disgorgement
of illicit profits and a fine.127 Accordingly, a strong sanction regime
is needed to deter parties from engaging in deceptive pretexts to obtain
inside information.
While the pervasive nature of insider trading can possibly be
addressed through more vigilant prosecution and stiffer fines and
penalties,128 such a remedy fails to address the increasing sophistica-
tion of insider trading. 29  Cherif illustrates the deficiencies of the
embezzlement model, reflecting as it does the increasing sophistication
of the deceptive practices presently being employed, practices that go
beyond the use of a fiduciary duty as a pretext to obtain inside
information. Although the defendant in Cherif was eventually
convicted of violating the mail and wire fraud statutes,13 0 it seems
that one who uses deception as a pretext to gain inside information
upon which to trade securities should be liable under the securities
laws and not solely on the basis of fraudulent use of the mails.
Moreover, the incentives131 to obtain inside information make it clear
that in the future ever more sophisticated forms of deception will be
employed to gain such information. Therefore, given the sophistication
of insider trading and the incentives to engage in it, a broader type of
criminal liability is needed to cover any type of willful, deceptive
pretext used to obtain inside information upon which to trade
securities. The theft by deception model reflects such a broader type
of criminal liability.
IV. MEETING THE CRITICISM OF THE
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
The dissenting opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas center on
their concerns for preserving federalism and substantive due process.
126. Id. at 34.
127. Id. at 35.
128. See generally id. Schroeder cites the relatively minor civil penalties as a reason for
bringing more Rule lOb-5 criminal actions.
129. See, e.g., SEC v. Boesky, Litig. Rel. No. 11288, 1986 WL 15283 at"1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
14, 1986).
130. See Cherif, 943 F.3d at 695. See generally United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 205,
275 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (describing mail and wire fraud liability as accruing where one receives
confirmation of the fraudulently traded stock through the mails).
131. See, e.g., O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 614 (defendant made $4 million through the use of
inside information); Ruggiero, 56 F.3d at 650 (defendant made $665,000 through the use of inside
information); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (defendant made
$431,000 through the use of inside information).
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Justice Scalia expresses his concern for the impact of the embezzlement
model of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory on federalism by
citing how this model fails to comply with the "principle of leni-
ty."' 132  Justice Thomas expresses his concern for the issue of sub-
stantive due process by arguing that the majority in O'Hagan has
promulgated "a new rule," thereby failing to give adequate notice for
the purposes of substantive due process.'33 While both of these
criticisms have merit,'34 the language and congressional intent behind
the § 10(b) regime, along with the practical realities of prosecuting
securities fraud cases, tend to diminish the import of these criticisms.
Contrary to the view expressed by Justice Scalia, 35 both the
embezzlement model and the theft by deception model of the
misappropriation theory of Rule 1Ob-5 comport with the principle of
lenity"'36 and its underlying policy considerations. 37 The principle
of lenity states that where a statute is ambiguous, the ambiguities are
to be resolved in favor of a criminal defendant.1
8  Reno v. Koray139
outlines the test for determining the applicability of the principle of
lenity. In Koray, the Court found the principle of lenity to apply
where, "if after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, ...
we can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended."'40
The notion of "aid" for the purpose of lenity can be derived from the
language of a statute, other similarly worded provisions, or the
132. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2220.
133. See id. at 2220-30.
134. See generally Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court
Misappropriates the Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1212 (1997)
(arguing that the ill-defined scope of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory detracts from its
sanctional value); Michael D. Monico and Jacqueline S. Jacobson, Supreme Court Turns Insider
Trading Inside Out, 21 CHAMPION 12, 15 (Dec. 1997) (arguing that a broad application of the
misappropriation theory could lead to inconsistent sanctional goals).
135. See generally O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2220. Justice Scalia asserts § 10(b) must be
construed to require the manipulation or deception of a party to a securities transaction. The
language of § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 refutes Scalia's assertion by referring to deception involving
purchases and sales of securities, rather than purchasers or sellers of securities. This, however,
is a minor critique of Scalia's dissent, the thrust of which is the issue of whether the embezzle-
ment model of the Rule 1Ob-5 misappropriation theory comports with the rule of lenity.
136. See id. at 2206-07. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78j ("operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"). The "person" for the
purposes of the misappropriation theory of Rule 1Ob-5 is the party with whom a fiduciary duty
is broken.
137. See United States v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1989).
138. See Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990). See also United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) ("[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity.").
139. 515 U.S. 50 (1995).
140. Id. at 65.
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legislative history of a statute."' The language of § 10(b), and in
particular Rule 10b-5, speaks to the use of "any act, practice, or course
of business which . . .would operate as a fraud upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." '142 The first
part of this passage addresses the scope of the acts covered, specifically
the proscription of any act which would operate as a fraud used to
purchase or sell securities. The second part of this passage addresses
the parties covered by the act, in particular those engaged in the
purchase or sale of securities through deceptive means. Both § 10(b)
and Rule 1 Ob- 5 use extremely broad language covering a variety of acts
that could be considered fraudulent. Embezzlement is a subclass of the
more general class of fraud; embezzlement only proscribes fraud arising
from breach of a fiduciary duty.' Theft by deception, when
compared to embezzlement, is more akin to the general class of fraud
cited in the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Specifically, theft by
deception proscribes the creation of false impressions as to intentions,
rather than the mere use of a fiduciary relationship as a fraudulent
pretext.'44 Accordingly, the embezzlement model is a narrow reading
of statutory language that can support a broader sanctional model in
the form of theft by deception.
The Court's decision in O'Hagan comports both with similarly
worded provisions of the 1934 Act and the history of the 1934 Act
when one looks to an aggregate of other policy considerations. The
1934 Act was created as a response to the variety of fraudulent,
deceptive schemes perpetrated by market insiders against market
outsiders. 14  These schemes sought to exploit informational dispari-
ties between parties trading securities.'46 Similarly, trading on inside
information obtained through a deceptive pretext has the effect of
creating an informational disparity between those who have inside
information and those who do not. In Chiarella v. United States, 147
141. See generally id. at 52-61.
142. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
143. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
144. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3(1).
145. See 77 CONG. REc. 3324-25 (1933).
146. See supra notes 15, 16. See also 78 CONG. REc. 8173 (1934), which states:
Summing up this statement to get a general conclusion on just one stock, we find
a stock very inactive, because closely held, raised from $6 plus in February 1932 to $89
7/8 on July 18, 1933, then dropping to around $30, and at the time of the hearing
selling at about $40. My comments on it do not touch on whether it is valuable and
with ample background of business activity, but that various dummy processes and the
work of options, syndicates, pools, and so forth, created a false sense of activity that led
the public to invest.
147. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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the Supreme Court defined the type of disparities covered by the
§ 10(b) regime by rejecting the fraud on the market theory 4
Namely, under the Court's analysis in Chiarella, informational
disparities in the market were not, by themselves, seen as a reason to
preserve fairness, honesty, and integrity in the markets. 49 Rather,
the values of fairness, honesty, and integrity were seen to proscribe a
market participant from engaging in deceptive and fraudulent practices
which create informational disparities.' While O'Hagan is consis-
tent with the Chiarella court's emphasis on proscribing the fraudulent
acts of individuals, it is unclear whether the victim in O'Hagan is the
type of individual that Congress envisioned protecting via the § 10(b)
regime. In particular, much of the 1934 Act is devoted to protecting
those involved in a securities transaction and not those outside such a
transaction. Despite this inconsistency, it is clear that Congress was
attempting to proscribe a variety of deceptive practices via the § 10(b)
regime, and the breach of a fiduciary duty in the course of obtaining
inside information could be one such deceptive practice that Congress
envisioned. Moreover, the ever increasing sophistication of insider
trading l'' and congressional reluctance to define insider trading" 2
necessitate such a broad sanction regime. Accordingly, the congressio-
nal intent behind the § 10(b) regime, the increasing sophistication of
insider trading, and congressional reluctance to define insider trading
support the broad language of both the embezzlement model and a
theft by deception model of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory.
The Court's decision in O'Hagan comports with the policy
considerations underlying the principle of lenity. Of the three policies
underlying the rule of lenity,"5 3 that relating to the Supreme Court's
reluctance to define as a federal crime conduct traditionally denounced
by states as criminal is most at risk of being violated by a broad
reading of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory. At its root, this
148. See id. at 232-34.
149. See id. See generally supra note 4 (I.T.S.F.E.A. and I.T.S.A. citing values of fairness,
honesty, and integrity in the markets as central value concerns).
150. See generally Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-29. ("This relationship gives rise to a duty to
disclose because of the 'necessity of preventing a corporate insider from . . . taking unfair
advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders.").
151. See, e.g., Cherif, 943 F.3d 692.
152. See supra note 50. The I.T.S.F.E.A. drafting committee did not believe that a failure
to define insider trading impedes the progress of needed enforcement reforms.
153. See generally Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (the three policy considerations behind the principle




is a problem of federalism," 4 a problem the court in Bryan recog-
nized when it observed:
Moreover, while the courts adopting the misappropriation theory
incant that the breach of a fiduciary relationship is a necessary
element of the offense, in principle, if not in reality, these courts
would be obliged to find liability in the case of simple theft by an
employee, even where no fiduciary duty has been breached, for the
raison d'etre of the misappropriation theory in fact is concern over,
"the unfairness inherent in trading on [stolen] information. '
And as that court further noted: "The only alternative to the
inevitable patchwork of criminal standards that will develop under the
theory would be the effective federalization of relationships historically
regulated by the states."' 6 The above passages reflect the Supreme
Court's concern that a regime of federal common law crimes could be
created under § 10(b). Such a common law scheme, while not only
problematic in itself,5 7 would also be problematic because it would
allow the SEC and federal courts to define what acts constitute a
deceptive pretext under the broad wording of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
This is problematic because, based on the language of § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, the SEC could theoretically seek to criminally sanction
individuals who use deceptive practices to obtain money and then use
this money to trade securities. Such a sanction power would intrude
upon the various existing state sanctional regimes which proscribe
criminal theft and fraud.5 8 The result of such an intrusion would
be a unilateral shifting of power from the states to the federal
government, and in particular the SEC.
154. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) ("What the concept does
represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that
will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States."); Tarble's Case, 13 Wall.
397, 406, 20 L. Ed. 597 (U.S. 1872) ("There are within the territorial limits of each state two
governments, restricted in their spheres of action, but independent of each other, and supreme
within their respective spheres.").
155. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 951 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241).
156. Id.
157. See generally KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 80, at 297-98. The authors discuss
the demise of common law crimes on the basis that they violate due process by not providing
notice to would be violators. Id.
158. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-5-101 - 18-5-804 (crimes involving fraud)
(Colorado District Attorney's Counsel 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.56.020 (theft) (West
1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-4 (theft by deception) (West 1995); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 720 para. 5/16-1 (theft) (West 1993); 1996 CAL. STAT. ANN. § 484 (theft) (West 1996).
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Overlapping jurisdiction is not a problem for federalism. Double
jeopardy statutes not only work to preserve individual rights, but
federalism as well. Specifically, if a state prosecutes an individual the
federal government will not, and vice-versa." 9 Furthermore, most
states do not have the resources, logistical support, or desire to enforce
laws against securities fraud. 6' As the Hilton stock example illus-
trates, securities fraud can involve multiple parties in multiple
jurisdictions.' 6 ' Tracking parties who commit securities fraud is time
consuming and costly. Even if the definition of fraud in Rule 10b-5
was expanded to cover fraudulent acts proscribed by state regimes,
most states would defer prosecution of these individuals to the federal
government. Thus, a unilateral shift in power to the federal govern-
ment would have little effect.
Contrary to the dissent of Justice Thomas, an individual's right
to substantive due process is not violated by the failure to codify the
misappropriation theory of Rule 1Ob-5. According to Justice Thomas:
I need not address the coherence, or lack thereof, of the
majority's new theory, for it suffers from a far greater, and disposi-
tive, flaw: It is not the theory offered by the Commission. Indeed,
as far as we know from the majority's opinion, this new theory has
never been proposed by the Commission, much less adopted by rule
or otherwise. 62
As Justice Thomas continued: "Putting aside the dubious validity of
an open ended delegation to an independent agency to go forth and
create regulations criminalizing 'fraud,' in this case we do not even
have a formal regulation embodying the agency's misappropriation
theory."' 63 Justice Thomas's dissent points to the fact that the SEC
has failed to codify the misappropriation theory via its enforcement
power under § 10(b). 164 The result of such a failure to codify the
misappropriation theory is a lack of adequate notice for due process
purposes.
159. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-303 (second trial barred by prosecution in another
jurisdiction); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.43.030 (1996) (foreign conviction or acquittal); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:1-1 1 (West 1995) (former prosecution in another jurisdiction: when a bar); ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720 para. 5/3-4 (effect of former prosecution) (West 1993); 1996 CAL.
STAT. ANN. § 656 (offenses also punishable by foreign law; double jeopardy).
160. See supra note 114.
161. See supra note 115.
162. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2224 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 2226.
164. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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The "willfulness" requirement of Rule 10b-5 solves the substan-
tive due process concerns put forth by Justice Thomas. Substantive
due process requires that a defendant be given fair warning of the law
in a language the common person understands and, more importantly,
what the law intends to do if it is violated. 6 ' One only incurs Rule
10b-S liability where one willfully'66 violates Rule 10b-5; that is, one
knows of the rule and violates the rule anyway.'67 The willfulness
element tends to alleviate any of the substantive due process concerns
put forth by Justice Thomas. Accordingly, the language of Rule 1Ob- 5
meets the notice requirement for substantive due process purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
Utility dictates that insider trading be proscribed through a
broadly worded sanction regime. Historically, inside information has
been the vehicle by which fraudulent practices were perpetrated in the
stock market. 6 These fraudulent practices have grown in recent
years from groups of individuals trading via stock pools,'69 to the
present day sophistication of individuals such as Boesky"7 ° and
Cherif. 71 If one adds in both the "word of mouth"'72 phenomenon
and incentives to engage in insider trading,' 73 it is clear that only a
broad sanction regime will be able to address the breadth of the
problem as it presently exists.'7 4 This broader sanction regime could
be modeled on theft by deception sanctioning: the willful creation of
false impression of intent in another as a deceptive pretext to gain
inside information used in the buying or selling of securities. While
165. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1989); Bass, 404 U.S. at 348. Cf.
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (striking down as void for vagueness
a city ordinance forbidding loitering and a variety of other offenses on the basis that the ordinance
failed to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that a particular act is forbidden by
statute); Lonzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required at peril of
life, liberty, or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be
informed as to what the State commands or forbids.").
166. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2214 (1997).
167. Id.
168. See Helmoop Noyes, supra note 23 (describing the use of inside information in
securities trading during the 1930s).
169. See supra note 15.
170. See SEC v. Boesky, Litig. Rel. No. 11288, 1986 WL 15283, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov 14,
1986).
171. See Cherif, 943 F.3d 692.
172. See Gilbert, supra note 114 (describing the word of mouth exchange of inside
information as a vehicle for insider trading).
173. See supra note 131.
174. See generally supra note 2 (documenting various examples of insider trading cited by
the media).
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concerns of federalism and substantive due process act to limit such a
broad reading of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, such concerns must be
weighed against the practical realities of insider trading.
